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The Enforcement of Collective Bargaining
Agreements by Arbitration in Louisiana
Alvin B. Rubin*
Arbitration is not new to this century. In the fifteenth cen-
tury, Rabelais wrote about arbitration of disputes in the streets
of Paris.
Somewhere near the Seine, he wrote, near a shop where roast
meat was being cooked, a hungry porter was eating his meal. A
fat goose was being turned on a spit in the rotisserie, and the
porter held his bread above the steaming goose to absorb into the
dry bread the flavor and vapor of the fire and the goose. Sud-
denly the cook observed the porter, grabbed him by the collar,
and demanded payment for the smoke emanating from his roast
goose. The porter protested vehemently: he had taken nothing;
the smoke was valueless; it would have gone uselessly up in the
air anyhow; and besides it had never been seen or heard that
roast meat smoke was sold upon the streets of Paris.
Along came Seyny John, who was known as the fool and citi-
zen of Paris. Both parties agreed to submit the dispute to him
for determination. After hearing their arguments Seyny John
asked the porter for a silver coin. The porter handed over the
coin and John flipped it upon the hearth two or three times, mak-
ing it ring and tingle. Thereupon, drawing himself to full height,
Seyny John pronounced his award: "The Court declareth, that
the porter, who ate his bread at the smoke of the roast-meat,
hath civilly paid the cook with the sound of his money; anel the
said court ordaineth that everyone return to his own home and
attend his proper business, without cost and charges."'
This tale should point no moral as to the custom of arbi-
trators in the decision of cases. But it does indicate the antiquity
of the institution. Indeed, it is said by some authorities that
arbitration to settle disputes antedated the courts of common law
* Member: Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge; Part-
time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The author expresses his appreciation to Henry Mayer, Esq., of New York
City, who related this tale in his bi-monthly labor service.
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in England. In any event, the institution of arbitration is older
even than the story of Seyny John. But the use of arbitration in
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements is much
more recent.
Arbitration to enforce collective bargaining agreements was
known in the nineteenth century in the United States, but it was
used relatively infrequently. Even after the passage of the Wag-
ner Act, when thousands of new collective bargaining agreements
were made in the 1930's and 1940's, there appeared to be consid-
erable reluctance on the part of both management and labor to
entrust the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to
arbitration.
However, the National War Labor Board during World War
II decided many cases involving disputes over the terms of col-
lective bargaining agreements. It adopted a policy of requiring
the use of clauses providing for the arbitration of future dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of the agree-
ment.
2
Familiarity with arbitration of questions concerning the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements led to wider ac-
ceptability of the process. In 1944 the Bureau of Labor Statistics
found that 73 percent of the contracts studied by it contained
arbitration clauses. In 1949 83 percent of the contracts studied
contained such clauses. In 1952 such clauses were contained in
89 percent of the 1,442 agreements studied.
The arbitration process varies of course in each collective bar-
gaining agreement. A typical agreement provides that any griev-
ances "which arise shall be taken up with the other party pursuant
to a specified procedure. This is usually a discussion with repre-
sentatives of the other party on successively higher levels of au-
thority. The final step of the grievance procedure is generally
a conference between the local union president and the plant
manager. If they are unable to reach a settlement of the griev-
ance, arbitration may be demanded within a stated period of
time.
Grievances are usually broadly defined. But the arbitration
clause may restrict the scope of questions which are arbitrable
2. ELKOURI, I-low ARBITRATION WORKS 6 (1952) ; Freidin & Ulman, Arbitra-
tion and the National War Labor Board, 58 HAnv. L. REV. 309 (1945).
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to questions of interpretation or application of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and of grievances arising under it. Thus new
contract proposals, wage rates, and complaints outside the scope
of the agreement may be excluded from arbitration.
The typical complaint for arbitration is that a party to the
agreement has violated it in some fashion. Submission of such
a grievance to arbitration is in effect enforcement of the col-
lective bargaining agreement through the arbitration process.
Obviously, this process of grievance arbitration is a quasi
judicial process. It is a method to settle disputes arising in the
course of administration of collective bargaining agreements. As
a method of dispute settlement it has been found to have certain
major advantages over normal judicial procedures: it is quick
and inexpensive, and it can normally be conducted in an informal
manner, without detailed procedural and evidentiary rules.
But arbitration in this area is not merely a substitute for
judicial decision. It is usually thought of by the parties pri-
marily as a substitute for and a remedy for unilateral economic
action. Most important of all of the factors leading management
and labor to agree to arbitration is the belief that strikes can be
avoided by providing a fair remedy to parties who are aggrieved
by events occurring during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement.
In addition, arbitration serves as a safety valve. Even un-
founded complaints may fester in the industrial air. Arbitration
provides a neutral, in whom both parties may have confidence,
who may hear the complaint, examine it, and pronounce upon its
merits. The losing party may become convinced of the lack of
merit of his claim. Even if he is not convinced, however, he is
apt to be more satisfied with the fact that he has had a full hear-
ing. And it has not been unknown to happen that a losing party
could relieve some of his complaint by transferring his rancor to
the arbitrator and his decision.
Thus arbitration can attempt to clear the air. It may prevent
a series of relatively small complaints building up into an ex-
plosive situation. It is primarily a substitute for economic war-
fare between the parties. In this role, voluntary arbitration has
been encouraged by both state and federal legislation. In dis-
cussing the enforcement of the arbitration clause, therefore, we
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must not overlook the fact that, in the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements, arbitration is something more than a
substitute for court decision. The vast majority of arbitration
cases would never end up in court were there no arbitration.
They would wind up either as unresolved problems potentially
productive of future difficulty or as the provocation of strikes,
work stoppages, slowdowns, lockouts, discharges and other
punitive economic action.
ARBITRABILITY AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Even where both parties are willing to employ the arbitra-
tion process to settle their differences, various problems arise in
the course of submission to arbitration. A recurring problem is
whether the dispute is arbitrable. Is the matter in dispute a
problem of the kind which the parties have agreed to submit to
arbitration? The problem is jurisdictional, for the sole authority
of the arbitrator is the delegation of jurisdiction to him either
in the collective bargaining agreement or in a separate submis-
sion agreement by which a given dispute is submitted for his
decision.
Where the parties cannot agree upon arbitrability of a dis-
pute, it is not unusual for them to submit for the arbitrator's
decision the question whether or not the dispute is arbitrable.3
The matter of the arbitrator's jurisdiction has been held to be
ultimately a question for the courts, and some courts have issued
injunctions to stay arbitration, pending their determination of
the question of arbitrability.4
Another procedural problem is akin to the problem of joinder
of issues: May either party insist upon arbitrating two or more
disputes before the same arbitrator in the same hearing? Some-
thing more than the techniques for handling joined cases is in-
volved, however. A common objection to the joinder of arbitra-
tion cases is that the arbitrator will be inclined to "split the de-
cision," thus awarding a partial victory to each side. While this
3. See Caledonia Mills, Inc., 15 Lab. Arb. 474 (1950) ; Western Automatic, 9
Lab. Arb. 606 (1948).
4. Brampton Woolen Co. v. Local Union, 11 Lab. Arb. 487 (Sup. Ct. N.H.
1948). See collection of the cases in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 752, 766 (1952). But see
United Textile Workers v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 27 Lab. Cas. 69,098 (D.C. Me.
1955) ; Rogers Diesel & Aircraft Corp. v. Amalgamated Local, 15 L.R.R.M. 848(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1945). The problem is thoroughly discussed in FREIDIN, LABOR
ARBITRATION AND THE COURTs 6 (1952). Mr. Freidin concludes that jurisdiction
to determine the arbitrability of a dispute should be vested in the arbitrator. Id.
at 47.
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suspicion is probably ill founded when focused on the competent
and experienced arbitrator, there is no doubt that it is widely
held. Balanced against this distrust, however, are factors of con-
venience and economy. The arrangements to hear four cases
can be made almost as quickly as those on a single case, and the
expense of the hearing is not appreciably greater. Therefore, the
"per case" cost becomes considerably less. Given the issue to de-
termine, most arbitrators have decided in favor of efficiency and
against the suspicion of their own motives. In the absence of
controlling language in the collective bargaining agreement,
arbitrators generally decide that several cases can be submitted
at a single hearing.5
Jurisdiction to arbitrate may be questioned on the basis that
the answer to the question sought to be arbitrated is so clear that
arbitration cannot be required. Courts in New Jersey and New
York have held that, if the alleged dispute is without basis, arbi-
tration is not required.6 This rule, commonly referred to as the
"no-dispute" doctrine, may be based on a judicial distrust of
arbitration procedures or it may be simply an effort to discour-
age irresponsible resort to arbitration. Yet, logically, in deter-
mining whether a dispute is arbitrable, it is immaterial whether
the claim giving rise to it is well founded. The arbitration proc-
ess has values both as a safety valve and as a means of convinc-
ing the grievant that his claim is not well founded. 7 To permit
a party to refuse to arbitrate because he believes his position
clear is to deny those values at least in part. The lack of merit
of a claim should not affect its arbitrability s
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
If either party is unwilling to submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion, the other may seek court relief, either by what is in effect
5. See awards in Armstrong Cork Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 13 (1954); American
Hardware Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 588 (1954). Cf. FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND
THE COURTS 5 (1952) : "It has many times been argued, however, that labor dis-
putes are of such unique character, their proper settlement and mode of settlement
so frequently unorthodox and improvised, that the question is best left to the
presumed expertness of the arbitrator. It has been argued, too, and with much
force, that arbitration clauses ought to be broadly enough construed to give to the
arbitrator power to determine his own jurisdiction, in which case the role of the
courts in the arbitration process would be considerably limited."
6. "The mere allegation of the existence of a dispute within the terms of the
contract requiring arbitration does not require arbitration if the alleged dispute is
without basis." In re Gottfried Oppenheimer, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. 154 (S. Ct. N.Y.
1955). The cases are summarized in Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 752, 756 (1952).
7. See FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS 10-11 (1952).
8. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 752, 756 (1952).
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a suit for breach of contract, or by asking specific performance
of the arbitration agreement. 9 At common law an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes was not enforceable. 10 The Louisiana
Civil Code contains a title "Of Arbitration"" which deals with
arbitration after a writtenI 2 submission of "a lawsuit or differ-
ence.' 1 8 There were early intimations that Louisiana courts
might be willing to recognize the validity of executory agree-
ments to arbitrate, 14 but the Louisiana Supreme Court took the
view that such a contract is "dependent for its execution on the
will of the parties." The court would not enforce agreements
"whereby persons undertake, with regard to matters to arise in
the future, to close the doors of the courts upon themselves."' 5
LOUISIANA LEGISLATION
'Since provisions for the arbitration of future disputes were
considered desirable in many types of commercial contracts, the
utility of the arbitration agreement outweighed the judicial dis-
trust of the arbitration forum, and many states, as well as the
Congress of the United States, adopted statutes permitting the
enforcement of executory arbitration agreements. In 1928,
Louisiana adopted an arbitration law.16 This was eventually re-
placed by the Louisiana Arbitration Law of 194817 which pro-
vided that "a provision in any written contract to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of the contract" shall
be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."' 8 If a suit is "brought
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
9. Since this paper deals with the use of the arbitration process, the use of
declaratory proceedings for an interpretation of the basic agreement has not been
covered.
10. See UPDEGRAFF & McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 55 (1946). It
has been suggested that "while such hostility is historically explicable with respect
to the arbitration of commercial disputes, it would not have played any part in the
development of labor arbitration had it been understood that labor disputes were
not the stuff of lawsuits, and had never been, but of strikes; that they had rarely
been taken to court but to the picket line, and that the no-strike clause in the
collective agreement and the willingness to continue working while new contract
differences were being resolved were both principles that grew out of the arbitra-
tion procedure." FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS 1 (1952).
11. Title XIX, art. 3099 et seq.
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3100 (1870).
13. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3099 (1870).
14. See Alford v. Tiblier, 1 McGloin 151 (La. 1880).
15. Saint v. Martel, 127 La. 73, 53 So. 432 (1910) ; see State ex rel. Watkins
v. North American Land & Timber Co., 106 La. 621, 31 So. 172 (1902).
16. La. Acts 1928, No. 262, p. 498.
17. La. Acts 1948, No. 377, p. 1013, incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:4201 et seq.
(1950).
18. LA. R.S. 9:4201 (1950).
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writing for arbitration, the court in which suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved ... is referable to arbitra-
tion under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until an arbitration has been
had.... ."" Thus, the Louisiana Arbitration Law permits both
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate and the stay
of other proceedings pending arbitration.
The statute thus constitutes a means to enforce arbitration
compacts judicially. But a limitation contained in its final sec-
tion must be considered before the act can be applied to arbitra-
tion clauses in collective bargaining agreements: "Nothing con-
tained in this Chapter shall apply to contracts of employment
of labor or to contracts for arbitration which are controlled by
valid legislation of the United States. . .. "20
It is arguable that a collective bargaining agreement is a
"contract of employment of labor," and a court which viewed
arbitration proceedings with distrust might adopt this interpre-
tation. Yet there are significant differences between the words
"contracts of employment of labor" and collective bargaining
agreements, just as there are important legal distinctions be-
tween a contract of employment and a collective bargaining
agreement.21 Collective bargaining agreements are far broader
in scope than "contracts of employment of labor," and there is
doubt whether they are truly in any sense contracts of em-
ployment, for normally such agreements give employment to no
one. They merely fix the terms and conditions of collective bar-
gaining and of such employment as may exist. The collective
bargaining agreement is more nearly a labor code than a con-
tract of employment. Other methods of distinguishing the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the employment contract will
occur to counsel interested in finding coverage by the statute,
just as points of identity will occur to those seeking to limit cov-
erage of the Louisiana Arbitration Act. No decisions interpret-
ing the clause have been found, and the merit of any argument
will rest upon its ultimate judicial acceptability.
19. LA. R.S. 9:4202 (1950).
20. LA. R.S. 9:4216 (1950).
21. See opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in J. I. Case Co. v. NLIB, 321 U.S.
332, 334-35 (1955) : "Collective bargaining between employer and the representa-
tives of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms which will govern
hiring and work and pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of
employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obliga-
tion to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it alone."
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My own view is that the Louisiana Arbitration Act should be
held to apply to collective bargaining agreements. 22 There is a
slight but significant difference in language from the earlier act
which said that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of [sic] disputes between employees, or employers of
labor .... ,,23 (Emphasis added.) The Legislature has declared
it the public policy of the state that "the settlement of issues
between employers and employees... may be advanced by mak-
ing available full and adequate state governmental facilities for
...voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employers and
the representatives of their employees . . .to make all reason-
able efforts to settle their differences by mutual agreement...
or by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable
agreement for the settlement of disputes. ' 24 (Emphasis added.)
The Louisiana Labor Mediation Board is to "do all in its power
to promote" voluntary arbitration, as well as mediation and con-
ciliation,2 5 although "the failure or refusal of either party to
agree to any procedure suggested by the board shall not be
deemed a violation of any duty or obligation imposed by this
Part.' '2 6 The act which created the Mediation Board recognized
that "rights" might be available for arbitration under other
Louisiana laws.2 7 This act might itself be considered to recog-
nize the validity of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements. 28 And finally we come back to the words of the arbi-
tration act itself: it is difficult to see that the code of industrial
22. A contrary view was assumed in a summary of Louisiana Legislation of
1918, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 19 (1948). But in FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION
AND THE COURTS 2, n. 10 (1952), Louisiana is cited as enforcing future disputes
clauses contained in collective labor agreements.
23. La. Acts 1928, No. 262, § 16, p. 503, as amended by La. Acts 1932, No.
218, p. 706. Section 2 of the 1932 act provided expressly for arbitration of dis-
putes between an employer of not less than fifty employees and "between an asso-
ciation, union or other protective employer's [sic] organization, numbering not
less than fifty of its membership, as such employees ...."
24. LA. R.S. 23:861 (1950). Considerable editorial license has been exer-
cised in expunging materials not relevant to arbitration from the quotation but
I believe the net result is an accurate resum6 of the provisions of the statutory
section relative to arbitration.
25. LA. R.S. 23:868 (1950).
26. Ibid. These words imply that the statute does, or at least may, impose
duties and obligations on employers and employees.
27. LA. R.S. 23:872 (1950).
28. See ibid. : "If the collective bargaining agreement between the parties con-
tains provisions for arbitration, these provisions shall prevail in the arbitration of
the controversy." If there is no collective bargaining agreement containing pro-
visions for arbitration, the act specifies a procedure to be followed, but the parties
must agree in writing to arbitration and must state specifically the question to be
submitted. LA. R.S. 23:873 (1950).
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relations which is the usual collective bargaining agreement can
be considered a contract of employment of labor.
LEGISLATION OF THE UNITED STATES
To determine the meaning of the limitation in the Louisiana
Arbitration Act excluding its applicability to "contracts for arbi-
tration ... controlled by valid legislation of the United States,"
it is necessary to look to federal legislation. In matters involving
state law, the federal courts are of course obliged to follow state
law on the validity of executory arbitration agreements. 29 Con-
gress may however provide the rules of decision for cases involv-
ing federal questions, as well as the rules of procedure in federal
courts. Two federal acts relate to our problem. The United
States Arbitration Act 30 provides that agreements to arbitrate
in "a ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce"
are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."'1 The court may order
specific performance of the arbitration agreement,3 2 and may
stay proceedings upon any issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for arbitration. The act contains pro-
visions for compelling the attendance of witnesses, and for en-
forcement of the award of the arbitrators. However, the first
section of the act defines commerce and states that "nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of sea-
men, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce. '34
The clause quoted raises two questions: (1) Is a collective
bargaining agreement a "contract of employment"?; (2) Are
the employees covered by the agreement a "class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce"? The structure of the
act raises yet another question: Does the exception relating to
"contracts of employment" apply to the entire act or only to
those parts of the act which expressly deal with transactions in-
volving commerce ? Section 1 defines "commerce" and, as noted
above, states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
29. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
31. Id. § 2.
32. Id. § 4.
33. Id. § 3.
34. Id. § 1.
35. All three questions are suggested by Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Fed-
eral Courts, 67 I=HAav. L. REV. 591, 593 (1954),- and the first two are quoted from
his text.
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tracts of employment." Section 2 of the act provides that a writ-
ten provision "in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce" shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, but
section 3 provides for the issuance of a stay pending arbitration
in "any suit or proceeding.., brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration." Because somewhat
broader terms are used in section 3, and because the term "com-
merce" (defined in section 1) is not used in that section, it was
held in one case that the limitation upon coverage of contracts
of employment is applicable in determining the coverage of sec-
tion 2 but not in fixing the coverage of section 3.36 This decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was later recon-
sidered, and that court concluded that the act applies in equal
terms to applications for specific performance of arbitration
agreements and to motions to stay suits pending arbitration.
3 7
However, the Courts of Appeals which have considered the
question are at complete odds with regard to whether a collective
bargaining agreement is a contract of employment. The Courts
of Appeals for the Fourth" and Fifth3 9 Circuits hold collective
bargaining agreements to be contracts of employment within
the meaning of the United States Arbitration Act and a state-
ment in a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court 4° indicates that it
shares that view. The First 41 and Sixth42 Circuits hold that only
individual contracts of employment are excluded from coverage
36. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
37. Amalgamated Association v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310
(3d Cir. 1951) ; see Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952).
38. International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ; United Electrical Workers v. Miller
Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
39. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
40. See dicta in Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers International Union,
187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
41. Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America v.
General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Newspaper Guild of Boston
v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 233 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Goodall-Sanford,
Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, AFL, Local 1802, 233 F.2d 104 (1st
Cir. 1956).
42. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.
1954). The court distinguished Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir.
1944), stating that the earlier case was authority only for the proposition that
section 1 of the Arbitration Act is applicable to the whole act and is not authority
for the proposition that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of em-
ployment, mentioning that the suit in the Gatliff Coal Co. case was for individual
wages. However, the court did deny a stay order in the Hoover case because the
collective bargaining agreement did not provide for arbitration of the controversy
involved.
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by the act, and apply it to collective bargaining agreements. The
Eighth Circuit has held the act inapplicable to a suit for dam-
ages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement because a
stay of proceedings was not expressly sought, and therefore ap-
parently considered that the act might be applicable although it
did not specifically discuss this issue.43
Other federal courts have held that collective bargaining
agreements are not "contracts of employment. '44 Several state
courts have concluded that similar phrases in state legislation do
not apply to collective bargaining agreements.
45
That a collective bargaining agreement is a contract of em-
ployment is a logically doubtful proposition. Certainly it is not
literally a contract of employment, for no particular person is
employed by virtue of it. But it is apparent that the sharp con-
flict in the views adopted by the various circuits should lead soon
to a Supreme Court interpretation of the act and the meaning of
its terms.
The second salient of the problem is whether a distinction
should be drawn between workers "engaged" in commerce and
those who merely produce for commerce. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit developed another approach to the entire
coverage question by holding that the restriction of coverage in
the first section of the act applies only to workers actually en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The court held that the
act does not exclude coverage for workers engaged in the pro-
duction of goods for subsequent sale in interstate commerce and
hence its provisions are available in connection with arbitration
43. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Oliver Corp.,
205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953).
44. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); United Office and Professional Workers v. Monumental Life Insurance
Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; Brady Transfer and Storage Co. v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. 67,121 (N.D. I1. 1952).
45. See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV.
595, n. 15 (1954), citing Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770,
773-74 (1940) (a collective bargaining agreement held not to be a contract "per-
taining to labor" because "the considerations which would except [personal] con-
tracts to perform labor from such proceedings do not exclude collective bargaining
agreements") ; Kaplan v. Bagrier, 12 Pa. D. & C. 693 (C.P. 1929) (collective bar-
gaining agreement not a "contract for personal services"). Contra, Retail Cigar,
Drug & Luncheonette Employees Local 1034 v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 67 Pa. D. & C.
512 (C.P. 1949) (collective bargaining agreement not a "contract for personal
services").
In Pennsylvania, the cases are in conflict as to whether the statutory excep-
tion of contracts "for personal services" applies to collective bargaining agree-
ments. See FREIDIN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS, n. 13 (1952).
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clauses in collective bargaining agreements affecting such em-
ployees. 46 In this interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has joined.4 7 The issues involved here have been
referred to by Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law
School as "too nicely balanced to advocate either conclusion with
great conviction." However, Professor Cox urges that deciding
the meaning of the phrase "engaged in interstate commerce"
poses the same problem as deciding the meaning of the phrase
"contract of employment. '48  Because no conclusive weight can
be given to any interpretation of either clause, the decision
should be predicated upon whether national policy is to encour-
age or discourage arbitration procedures in cases arising out of
collective bargaining agreements.
49
Another possible avenue for the enforcement of collective
bargaining provisions for arbitration was opened by the Labor
Management Relations Act.50 Section 301 of the act 5' permits
suits for violation of contracts between employers and labor or-
ganizations representing employees in industries affecting com-
merce to be brought in the district courts of the United States.
This section has been relied upon by several courts in granting
specific performance of agreements to arbitrate. 52
46. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers, 207 F.2d 450
(3d Cir. 1953). The employer had brought suit for damages for breach of a no-
strike clause under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The
union sought a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. The stay was granted.
The decision is thoroughly examined and its result questioned in Cox, Grievance
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1954). A contrary
opinion was indicated in United Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products,
Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
47. Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
48. Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV. 591
(1954). Professor Cox urges that "one may assert dogmatically that the course
followed by the Third Circuit is clearly wrong. One should not rely on one policy
in interpreting the phrases relating to commerce and an opposite conception in
reading 'contract of employment.'"
49. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 122 F. Supp. 733 (D. Vt. 1954).
50. 61 STAT. § 201, p. 152, 29 U.S.C. § 171 et seq. (1947).
51. 61 STAT. § 301, p. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
52. In Wilson Brothers v. Textile Workers, 27 CCH Lab. Cas. 69,026 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), in which the court deliberated applicability of the Arbitration Act, but
stated that question need not be decided for "Section 301(a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act has generated of its own force the remedy of compelling
arbitration." Textile Workers v. Aleo Manufacturing Co., 94 F. Supp. 626(D.N.C.
1950) ; Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass.
1953). See Katz & Jaffe, Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses by Section 301,
Taft-Hartley Act, 8 ARm. J.(N.S.) 80 (1953) ; Evening Star Newspaper Co. v.
Columbia Typographical Union, 22 Lab. Arb. 262 (D.C.D.C. 1954); Insurance
Agents International Union v. Prudential Insurance Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 110 (E.D.
Pa. 1954).
Professor Cox, in Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 11ARV. L.
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However, the full scope of section 301 still awaits definition.58
In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house 54 the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction of a wage claim
brought by a union. The basis stated in the opinion by Justice
Frankfurter was that Congress did not intend to burden the fed-
eral courts with suits of this type,5 5 but the opinion indicated
in dictum that the section is procedural and that state law is the
applicable substantive law. 56 If this is true, then suits to enforce
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements would be
governed by state law even if federal jurisdiction to entertain
such suits is granted by section 301. But whether this is the
Supreme Court's view is not yet clear, because of the differences
in opinion on the court. One federal court, subsequent to the
decision, ordered arbitration, but stated it would not decide
whether or not it had jurisdiction to decide the actual contro-
versy which was the subject of arbitration.57 Another federal
district court has taken the view that the Westinghouse decision
had the effect of denying the court authority to order arbitra-
tion.58 The circuit courts are having difficulty with the problem,
too. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit believes that
REv. 591, 598 (1954), suggests that, in compelling specific performance of an
arbitration clause under the LMRA, it is necessary for the plaintiff to invoke
sections 2 and 4 of the Arbitration Act. He further suggests that the plaintiff
then moves into a dilemma: He must show that the collective agreement is a
contract "evidencing a transaction involving com/merce" (under section 2 of the
Arbitration Act) but that it is not a "contract of employment" (under section 1
of the act) or else that the workers covered thereby are not "seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce." However, most of the courts which have granted relief under authority
of section 301 of the LMRA have not felt it necessary to rely in any fashion on
the Arbitration Act. Professor Cox notes that this is a "distinct but parallel
question."
The cases also raise the question of whether state law should control in an
action under section 301. Judge Wyzanski, in Textile Workers v. American
Thread Co., supra, felt that Congress "would have preferred that remedies should
be determined without reference to state law, and should include specific enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses in labor contracts." Professor Cox likewise considers
the question of specific performance of the arbitration compact a question of
remedy.
53. See Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement,
7 STAN. L. REV. 445 (1955).
54. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
55. Justice Reed concurred in a separate opinion on another basis, and Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Clark concurred in another separate opinion.
56. Justice Reed concurred in the result but would not agree on this score,
and the dissenting Justices Douglas and Black also apparently differed with Justice
Frankfurter.
57. United Textile Workers v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 28 Lab. Cas. 69,259 (D.
Me. 1955).
58. Newspaper Guild of Pawtucket v. Times Publishing Co., 28 Lab. Cas.
69,442 (D.R.I. 1955). See also Industrial Trades Union v. Dunn Worsted Mills,
131 F. Supp. 945 (D.R.I. 1955).
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section 301 grants jursidiction to the federal courts but that the
right to enforce submission to arbitration must be sought from
other "State or Federal sources." 59 "Finding nothing of Federal
origin or in the [State] laws" which required or permitted the
enforcement of arbitration, it dismissed a suit to compel arbitra-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that spe-
cific performance of an arbitration agreement is a remedial
matter, governed by federal law alone. It did not believe that
section 301 alone should be held to justify awarding this remedy,
but it held that it had authority to do so under the United States
Arbitration Act.60
Another issue sometimes urged is that the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act restricting the power of federal courts to
issue injunctions in labor disputes prevents the ordering of spe-
cific performance of arbitration agreements or the stay of ju-
dicial proceedings pending arbitration. Literally, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act might be so read. However, the purpose and his-
tory of the Norris-LaGuardia Act indicate that it has no ap-
plication to the situation where specific performance of agree-
ments voluntarily made is sought.61
It has been suggested that enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements may also be achieved on the basis that refusal
to arbitrate is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
the Labor Management Relations Act. The decisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board indicate that the board will not
support this view.
62
In the Fifth Circuit it appears reasonably certain that en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements may not be had
in federal court either under the provisions of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 or under the provisions of the
United States Arbitration Act. This leaves only one other ap-
proach available in federal courts in this circuit: a suit in which
federal jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship and
59. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
60. Local 205, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v.
General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956).
61. See Local 205, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v.
General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Lincoln Mills v. Textile
Workers, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956); Milk & Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie
Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Textile Workers v. American
Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
62. See Comment, Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements: Is Refusal
to Arbitrate an Unfair Labor Practice?, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 596 (1954).
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in which the right to relief is found in state law. We come then
full circle back to the Louisiana Arbitration Act.
That act provides that it shall not apply to "contracts for
arbitration which are controlled by valid legislation of the United
States." Under the federal decisions controlling in this circuit,
specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate is not avail-
able. The exception in the Louisiana statute should not apply
and there should be a right to relief in state courts. State courts
presumably are denied the power to enforce the arbitration
clause only in situations where valid federal legislation controls
the contract for arbitration.
CONCLUSION
The acceptability of arbitration as a means for resolving dis-
putes arising under collective bargaining agreements rests upon
the fundamental premise that an arbitration award will receive
the respect both of employers and employees. Should the arbitra-
tion forum cease to be generally acceptable, the arbitration pro-
vision is likely to disappear from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Most disputes will probably be resolved by voluntary arbitra-
tion, without resort to the courts for enforcement. However,
even where the general institution of arbitration is contractually
accepted, cases will arise in which one party or the other feels
it imperative to resist arbitration either by refusing to arbitrate
or by filing a lawsuit without resort to arbitration. In such
instances, where the industry is one affecting commerce, arbi-
tration can be had in some federal jurisdictions by suit for spe-
cific performance in reliance on the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947. Where reliance is on the United States Arbi-
tration Act, it is necessary to look to the decisions in the par-
ticular circuit in which suit is brought. To the author, the weight
of logic is with the minority of cases, respectable in number and
authority, which grant enforcement.
Executory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agree-
ments in intrastate industry have not yet been considered by
Louisiana courts. Nevertheless, sound reasons exist to find such
a remedy available in Louisiana. The strongest argument against
enforcement by Louisiana courts of executory agreements to
arbitrate is the fact that a number of the federal courts have
19561
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not applied the United States Arbitration Act in similar circum-
stances.
It is difficult to resist the logic that state policy should en-
courage voluntary arbitration as a substitute for economic war-
fare. The acceptability of the no-strike clause has paralleled the
development of a forum in which grievances can be heard and
resolved. The erection of judicial barriers to the entrance to
this forum or, indeed, the extended litigation of whether or not
the door to arbitration is open, would invite abandonment of
peaceful corridors and recourse again to economic warfare. Such
a result would be harmful both to employers and employees and
damaging to state and national interest. Until a better forum is
found, voluntary arbitration agreements deserve support and en-
forcement. An arbitration proceeding is neither a lawsuit nor
a substitute for a lawsuit. It is a procedure designed to meet
the need for a substitute for economic warfare. Only when
treated in this context can enforcement questions be properly
weighed.
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